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There is reason to believe, however, that
a decline in stock prices can have a
dampening effect on real GDP growth
and, in fact, cause real GDP growth to
fall. The next section explains how this
dampening effect works and examines
the evidence for it.
■ Firm Balance Sheet Effects
A decline in stock prices can dampen
future GDP growth through the credit
channel because debt is costly. Compa-
nies raise money either by issuing 
additional stock or by borrowing from 
a bank or the public. Debt brings with it
the possibility of bankruptcy, and there
are nontrivial bankruptcy costs (legal and
accounting) that could be avoided with
equity finance—that is, raising money 
by issuing more shares of stock. Then
why do firms issue debt? Besides the
obvious tax advantages, another reason is
that not all investors are equally informed
about a firm’s financial status. To ensure
that a firm’s managers correctly report on
the firm’s projects, investors use debt and
the resulting threat of costly bankruptcy 
proceedings as a means of ensuring good
managerial conduct. 
But in a world with perfect information
in which all investors are fully informed,
firms would entirely avoid costly bank-
ruptcy by being largely equity financed.
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When stock market values fall, we
know it means investors expect lower
economic growth in the future. But
can stock market declines actually
affect future growth? There is some
evidence that they can—through the
credit channel.
W ith the economy still officially in a
recession since March 2001, all eyes are
on the stock market to help answer how
quickly the economy will rebound from
the current slowdown. The reason the
stock market receives such attention is
that it is considered a leading indicator of
future economic activity. Recessions are
characterized by sharp falls in equity
prices, and these typically precede
slower economic growth by approxi-
mately two quarters (see figure 1). If we
used the stock market as our crystal ball,
albeit a very cloudy one, we would be
concerned that the recession might not
be over. The stock markets seemed to
recover during the last quarter of 2001—
by the beginning of 2002, the S&P 500
had risen over 20 percent from its low on
September 21. Since then, however, that
gain has been erased, and the market is
lower than it has been since 1997.
But why should stock prices and future
real GDP growth be related? This Eco-
nomic Commentary examines two
prominent explanations for why stock
market values and real GDP figures
move together. The first explanation
says that changes in information about
the future course of real GDP may cause
prices to change in the stock market
today. This explanation suggests that,
while stock prices are used to predict
future economic activity, the actual
causality is from future GDP growth
(that is, the prediction of it) to current
stock prices. The other explanation for
the linkage between the stock market
and real GDP growth is that changes in
stock prices, no matter what the source,
will reduce firms’asset positions and
affect the cost of their borrowing. When
it costs more for firms to borrow money,
they borrow and invest less, and when
firms invest less, real GDP growth
slows. According to this view—referred
to by some as balance-sheet effects and
others as the credit channel—stock
prices will change because of changes in
real economic conditions or some other
factor, but the credit channel may impact
the severity and length of recessions. 
■ Correlation Does Not Imply
Causality: Stock Prices and
Real GDP
While movements in stock prices precede
movements in GDP, it doesn’t prove that
stock price movements cause changes in
real GDP growth. In fact, the causality
may go the other way. Stock prices reflect
the fundamental value of the firm—the
present discounted value of future firm
earnings, so, by definition, they incorpo-
rate forecasts of future economic activity.
Investors who expect future GDP growth
to slow may lower stock prices today. But
just as we wouldn’t conclude that com-
muters cause afternoon rain because they
decided to carry an umbrella to work after
hearing the morning weather report, we
can’t conclude that when stock prices
change today, this causes future GDP
growth to change. 
This implies that a fall in the stock mar-
ket, if caused by some factor that does not
affect economic growth directly, might
not say anything about future GDP. For
example, suppose that the weakness in
the stock market at the beginning of 2002
was caused by general accounting worries
in the aftermath of Enron’s collapse and is
not directly related to forecasts of future
GDP growth. A fall in the stock market
for this reason might be bad for your
401(k)s but is not indicative of future low
GDP growth. Because of potential bankruptcy costs,
any debt issuance would be perfectly
safe, always at a level that could be cov-
ered even under the worst possible
profit scenario for the firm. Hence, in a
world without informational frictions,
firms would borrow at the same rate as
the government, a zero “risk premium.”
Because of credit frictions, however, a
firm’s cost of borrowing will typically
exceed a government’s cost of borrow-
ing. This difference, or wedge, between
these borrowing costs is inefficient for
the economy as a whole. The degree of
this inefficiency depends on firms’bal-
ance sheets. Firms with few assets, and
hence little collateral to back a loan in
the case of default, will borrow at the
highest rates. 
The credit channel works through the
stock market as follows: First, stock
prices change. This change can be
caused by something that has nothing to
do with the predicted value of firms’
future earnings (like the bursting of a
stock market bubble), but more often it
will occur because real economic condi-
tions change. Roughly speaking, an eco-
nomic downturn reduces stock prices
and hence the value of some firms’
assets. Now the credit channel comes
into play because lower stock prices
imply a decline in the amount of collat-
eral that the average corporation can
post when obtaining a loan. Therefore,
the risk premium and the cost of bor-
rowing for most firms will be higher. A
higher cost of borrowing further
depresses current output and decreases
future real GDP growth as well. Current
output will decline more than it would
have in the absence of these balance-
sheet effects because an increase in the
risk premium further reduces invest-
ment, which increases consumption and
reduces hours worked. 
Evidence of the credit channel can be
seen in the strong positive correlation
between the ratio of investment to mar-
ket capitalization (stock market value)
and one measure of the risk premium—
the difference between the bank prime
loan rate and the six-month Treasury
bill rate (see figure 2). The ratio of
investment to market capitalization rep-
resents the amount of borrowing firms
want to undertake (investment) relative
to the amount of collateral available
(market capitalization). To calculate the
risk premium, we use the bank prime
rate, a benchmark interest rate that
reflects how much banks might charge
their most creditworthy customers. This
is because if balance-sheet effects are
truly important for macroeconomic pur-
poses, they should affect stable busi-
nesses and not just fledgling mom and
pop stores. And because the prime rate 
is based on a short-term rate, we use the
six-month Treasury bill (the govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing) in calculating
the risk premium.
The strong correlation between the
investment-to-market-capitalization ratio
and the risk premium derives from the
way the risk premium is determined. The
risk premium is determined by the rela-
tionship between the amount of borrow-
ing that firms are undertaking and the
amount of collateral available to back
this borrowing. When firms invest more
heavily, their demand for borrowing
rises, which, for a given value of equity
prices (collateral), increases the risk pre-
mium. A decline in equity values also
increases the risk premium because it
decreases the amount of collateral avail-
able. The increase in the risk premium
from either source would tend to
decrease investment and thus output. 
■ Recessions and the Risk
Premium
If the credit channel is important in
helping drive the correlation between
the stock market and output, it has
implications for how we might expect
the risk premium and output to be corre-
lated. A fall in stock prices may cause
the risk premium to increase and invest-
ment and output to fall, thus generating
a negative association between the two.
On the other hand, if a weak economy
causes investment and thus borrowing to
fall by more than the decline in stock
prices, we would expect GDP growth
and the risk premium to be positively
related. 
If we examine the data carefully, there is
support for both of these possibilities. A
high risk premium tends to precede
lower economic growth, while low eco-
nomic growth tends to precede a lower
risk premium. Figure 3 shows that
decreases in real GDP growth tend to
precede increases in the risk premium
by four quarters, and increases in real
GDP growth tend to precede decreases
in the risk premium by the same
amount. The graph also shows that
recessions are generally preceded by
sharp increases in the risk premium. If
stock prices did not affect future real
GDP through the credit channel, we
would not necessarily expect any associ-
ation between real GDP growth and the
risk premium. 
NOTE:  Shaded areas indicate recessions.
SOURCES:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Wall Street Journal.
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FIGURE 2 CHANGES IN THE RISK PREMIUM AND THE RATIO OF BUSINESS 
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■ Conclusion
This Economic Commentary has
reviewed the reasons why stock prices
and real GDP may be correlated. In
doing so we have emphasized that
firms’balance-sheet effects may be
important in understanding output
growth. To understand this channel we
sometimes treated stock price changes
as occurring for some exogenous rea-
son, like the bursting of a stock market
bubble, and examined why this would
affect investment and output. Of
course, stock price changes very rarely
occur without a change in some funda-
mental economic variables. Reality is
likely a synthesis of both scenarios:
Future GDP growth affects current
stock prices, and this change in stock
prices affects future GDP growth. Most
people view the credit channel as
explaining how the feedback effects
between stock prices and real out-
put tend to amplify and propagate
exogenous shocks to output. 
For example, suppose that produc-
tivity in the coming quarters is
expected to slow. An upcoming
decline in productivity will lower
GDP tomorrow and cause the stock
market to drop today. But this drop
in the stock market may cause firms’
balance sheets to deteriorate, further
pushing down GDP. This is the
amplification part of the credit 
channel. But these effects may feed
on each other through time, thus
lengthening the coming recession.
This is the propagation part of 
the story.
In closing, let us consider the cur-
rent downturn. Unlike the deep
recessions in the mid-1970s and
early 1980s, the current downturn
and the 1991 recession both saw
only very small increases in the risk
premium. This suggests that the
credit channel has had only a small
effect in amplifying and propagat-
ing the current downturn. 
But this differential impact is what
the credit channel would predict. It
is during the largest downturns that
the stock market and collateral take
a big hit, causing a big increase in
the risk premium. Hence, the ampli-
fication and propagation effects of
the credit channel are likely to be
most significant during more severe
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